Jai Hind Jai Bharat

Jai Hind Jai Bharat

Thursday, September 30, 2010

Meaning of Nirmohi Akhara

Nirmohi Akhara is a institution formed in the year 1959 which has been in connection with the Ayodhya bebate and from the time the suit was made regarding the dispute land at Ayodhya / Babri Mosque. On 30th September 2010, the Allahabad High court announced the verdict / decision of this case along with a panel of three judges which included 2 hindu judges and 1 muslim judge which mentioned that the land would be divided into three parts ie to Hindu Mahasabha , Nirmohi Akhara and Sunni Central Waqf Board.

In short : A group of monks who are doing their daily rituals there and claimed that they are staying for long time and Ayodhya belongs to them. Nirmohi Akhara is an old Ayodhya based religious institution which filed a suit in January 1885 with the sub-judge of Faizabad, seeking consent to construct a temple over the Ram Chabutra, adjacent to the Babri Masjid.



--

Haider Ajaz

GIST OF THE FINDINGS by S.U.Khan J.


1. The disputed structure was constructed as mosque by or under orders of Babar.
2. It is not proved by direct evidence that premises in dispute including constructed portion
belonged to Babar or the person who constructed the mosque or under whose orders it was
constructed.
3. No temple was demolished for constructing the mosque.
4. Mosque was constructed over the ruins of temples which were lying in utter ruins since a
very long time before the construction of mosque and some material thereof was used in
construction of the mosque.
5. That for a very long time till the construction of the mosque it was treated/believed by
Hindus that some where in a very large area of which premises in dispute is a very small part birth
place of Lord Ram was situated, however, the belief did not relate to any specified small area
within that bigger area specifically the premises in dispute.
6. That after some time of construction of the mosque Hindus started identifying the premises
in dispute as exact birth place of Lord Ram or a place wherein exact birth place was situated.
7. That much before 1855 Ram Chabutra and Seeta Rasoi had come into existence and
Hindus were worshipping in the same. It was very very unique and absolutely unprecedented
situation that in side the boundary wall and compound of the mosque Hindu religious places were
there which were actually being worshipped along with offerings of Namaz by Muslims in the
mosque.
8. That in view of the above gist of the finding at serial no.7 both the parties Muslims as well
as Hindus are held to be in joint possession of the entire premises in dispute.
9. That even though for the sake of convenience both the parties i.e. Muslims and Hindus
were using and occupying different portions of the premises in dispute still it did not amount to
formal partition and both continued to be in joint possession of the entire premises in dispute.
10. That both the parties have failed to prove commencement of their title hence by virtue of
Section 110 Evidence Act both are held to be joint title holders on the basis of joint possession.
11. That for some decades before 1949 Hindus started treating/believing the place beneath the
Central dome of mosque (where at present make sift temple stands) to be exact birth place of Lord
Ram.
12. That idol was placed for the first time beneath the Central dome of the mosque in the early
hours of 23.12.1949.
13. That in view of the above both the parties are declared to be joint title holders in possession
of the entire premises in dispute and a preliminary decree to that effect is passed with the condition
that at the time of actual partition by meets and bounds at the stage of preparation of final decree
the portion beneath the Central dome where at present make sift temple stands will be allotted to
the share of the Hindus.

Order:-
Accordingly, all the three sets of parties, i.e. Muslims, Hindus and Nirmohi Akhara are
declared joint title holders of the property/ premises in dispute as described by letters A B C D E F
in the map Plan-I prepared by Sri Shiv Shanker Lal, Pleader/ Commissioner appointed by Court in
Suit No.1 to the extent of one third share each for using and managing the same for worshipping.
A preliminary decree to this effect is passed.
However, it is further declared that the portion below the central dome where at present the
idol is kept in makeshift temple will be allotted to Hindus in final decree.
It is further directed that Nirmohi Akhara will be allotted share including that part which is
shown by the words Ram Chabutra and Sita Rasoi in the said map.
It is further clarified that even though all the three parties are declared to have one third
share each, however if while allotting exact portions some minor adjustment in the share is to be
made then the same will be made and the adversely affected party may be compensated by
allotting some portion of the adjoining land which has been acquired by the Central Government.
The parties are at liberty to file their suggestions for actual partition by metes and bounds
within three months.
List immediately after filing of any suggestion/ application for preparation of final decree
after obtaining necessary instructions from Hon'ble the Chief Justice.
Status quo as prevailing till date pursuant to Supreme Court judgment of Ismail Farooqui
(1994(6) Sec 360) in all its minutest details shall be maintained for a period of three months unless
this order is modified or vacated earlier.

Wednesday, September 29, 2010

YA ZAINAB YA ZAINAB -ALI SAFDAR 2010.flv

Shadman Raza Nauha 2009 - Mere Hussain ko rohtay raho

Kia Dekhti Hai Sughra (s.a) By Shadman Raza!

aaseem 0 shaan shahenshah (full song)

Tuesday, September 28, 2010

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA----------RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

              Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal    RAMESH CHANDRA TRIPATHI                                  Petitioner(s)                     VERSUS  SUNNI CEN.BOARD OF WAKFS & ORS.                          Respondent(s)  (With appln(s) for deletion of deceased parties from the array of parties, intervention, exemption from filing O.T, impleadment, prayer for interim relief and office report)   Date: 28/09/2010    These Petitions were called on for hearing today.   CORAM :           HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE           HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AFTAB ALAM           HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN                               Mr. Goolam E. Vahanvati,AG.   For Petitioner(s)           Mr.   Mukul Rohtagi,Sr.Adv.                             Mr.   Prashant Chandra,Sr.Adv.                             Mr.   Sunil Kumar Jain,Adv.                             Mr.   Aneesh Mittal,Adv.   For Respondent(s)           Mr.   Anoop George Chaudhary,Sr.Adv.                             Mr.   Z. Jilani,Adv.                             Mr.   M.A. Siddiqui,Adv.                             Mr.   Shakil Ahmad Syed,Adv.                             Mr.   Mohd. Moonis Abbasi,Adv.                             Mr.   Shuaib Uddin,Adv.                             Mr.   M. Taiyab Khan,Adv.                             Mr.   C.M. Zafarullah,Adv.                             Mr.   Md. Izhar Alam,Adv.                                                              ....2/-            - 2 -  Mr.   Ravi Shankar Prasad,Sr.Adv. Mr.   P.S. Narasimha,Sr.Adv. Mr.   Anish Kumar Gupta,Adv. Ms.   Deep Shikha Bharati,Adv. Mr.   Bhupender Yadav,Adv. Mr.   Balasubrahmanyam Kamarsu,Adv. Mr.   D. Bharat Kumar,Adv. Mr.   Saurabh Shyam Shamshery,Adv.  Mr.   Sushil Kumar Jain,Adv. Mr.   Puneet Jain,Adv. Mr.   Ranjeet Lal Varma,Adv. Mr.   Arun K. Sharma,Adv. Mr.   Puneet Jain,Adv. Mr.   Tarun Jeet Varma,Adv. Ms.   Trishna,Adv.  Mr.   Vivek Sharma,Adv. Mr.   K.R. Gupta,Adv. Mr.   R.C. Gubrele,Adv. Mr.   Bankim K. Kulshreshtha,Adv.  Mr.   P.N. Mishra,Sr.Adv. Mr.   P.K. Behera,Adv. Ms.   Ranjana Agnihotri,Adv. Mr.   Rakesh Tewari,Adv. Mr.   Rajeev Mishra,Adv. Mr.   Alok Kumar Shukla,Adv. Mr.   S.S. Nehra,Adv.  Mr.   Baldev Atreya,Adv. Mr.   R.S. Tomar,Adv. Mr.   Sumit Tomar,Adv. Mr.   Atishi Dipankar,Adv.  Ms.   June Chaudhary,Sr.Adv. Mr.   Syed Shahid Hussain Rizvi,Adv. Mr.   Zaki Khan,Adv. Mr.   Irshad Haneef,Adv. Mr.   T. Khan,Adv. Mr.   D.K. Pradhan,Adv. Ms.   Neha Goyal,Adv.  Mr.   V. Giri,Sr.Adv. Ms.   Mahalakshmi Pavani,Adv. Mr.   Balaji,Adv. for   M/s. Mahalakshmi Balaji and Co.,Advs.  Mr. M.K. Michael,Adv.                                 ....3/-                                - 3 -                      Mr.   K.N. Bhat,Sr.Adv.                     Mr.   Krishnan Venugopal,Sr.Adv.                     Mr.   P.V. Yogeshwaran,Adv.                     Mr.   Vikramjeet Bannerjee,Adv.                     Mr.   Madan Mohan Pandey,Adv.                     Ms.   M. Indrani,Adv.                      Mr.   Neeraj Kumar Jain,Sr.Adv.                     Mr.   Sanjay Singh,Adv.                     Mr.   Manish Mohan,Adv.                     Mr.   Kaustubh N. Sinha,Adv.                     Ms.   Anita Mohan,Adv.                      Mr.   Soli J. Sorabjee,Sr.Adv.                     Mr.   Y.H. Muchchala,Sr.Adv.                     Mr.   Huzefa Ahmadi,Adv.                     Mr.   Ejaz Maqbool,Adv.                     Ms.   Garima Kapoor,Adv.                      Mr. Satish Ch. Mishra,Sr.Adv.                     Mr. Shail Kumar Dwivedi,AAG.                     Mr. G.V. Rao,Adv.         



UPON hearing counsel the Court made the following                           O R D E R             Having   considered     the    detailed    arguments advanced in these cases, we are of the view that the     special    leave     petitions     deserve     to    be dismissed.         Accordingly,    we     hereby     pass   the following order:           Special Leave Petition (C) Nos.27466-27467 of 2010 stand dismissed.          [ Alka Dudeja ]                   [ Madhu Saxena ]        A.R.-cum-P.S.                  Assistant Registrar   

Monday, September 27, 2010

S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A

 
                 
  RAMESH CHANDRA TRIPATHI                               Petitioner(s)
                                        VERSUS
 SUNNI CEN.BOARD OF WAKFS & ORS.                       Respondent(s)
 
(With appln(s) for deletion of parties in the array of parties
and prayer for interim relief and office report)
 
 
Date: 23/09/2010    These Petitions were called on for hearing
today.
 
 
 
CORAM :
          HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE R.V. RAVEENDRAN
          HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE H.L. GOKHALE
 
 
 
For Petitioner(s)      Mr. Mukul Rohtagi,Sr.Adv.
                       Mr. Sunil Kumar Jain,Adv.
                       Mr. Aneesh Mittal,Adv.
 
 
For Respondent(s)      Mr. Anoop G. Choudhury, Sr.Adv.
(For Respt. 1 & 5)     Mr. Shakil Ahmad Syed,Adv.
                       Mohd. Moonis Abbasi,Adv.
                       Mr. Shuabuddin,Adv.
 
(For Respt.No.20)      Mr.   Ravi Shankar Prasad,Sr.Adv.
                       Mr.   P.S. Narsimha,Sr.Adv.
                       Mr.   Anish Kumar Gupta,Adv.
                       Ms.   Deep Shikha Bharati,Adv.
 
           
 
 UPON hearing counsel the Court made the following
                               
O R D E R
 
Taken on board.
 
              Heard Shri Mukul Rohtagi, learned senior counsel                               
for the petitioner and Shri Anoop G. Choudhury, learned senior counsel for respondents 1 and 5 and Shri Ravi Shankar Prasad, learned senior   counsel for respondent No.20.
The petition for special leave is filed against an order rejecting an application under Section 89 of the C.P.C. filed by the petitioner before the Allahabad High Court to defer the judgment and refer the matter to mediation.
One of the members of this Bench is of the view that SLP should be dismissed having regard to the fact that the matter is already reserved for judgment to be pronounced tomorrow.          

Another member of the Bench is of the view that notice should be issued and an interim order be issued.
The tradition of this court has been that even if one of the members of the Bench feels that notice to be issued, notice will be issued, though the other member is not in favour of it.
 
          In view of it, issue notice.          
           Dasti in addition.
 
          There shall be interim stay of further proceeding 
in the suit O.O.S.No. 4 OF 1989 and connected suits and 
pronouncement of judgment, till further orders.
 
          List the matter on 28.9.2010.
 
          Let the notice be issued to the Attorney General
 
to assist the Court on that day.
 
          In view of the difference, place the matter before
         the  Hon'ble Chief Justice, for constituting a Larger
         Bench.
 
 
 
      (O.P. Sharma)                                (M.S. Negi)
      Court Master                                 Court Master

Sunday, September 26, 2010

Ramesh Chandra Tripathi ...................Applicant


Civil Misc. Application No.

Hon'ble S.U.Khan, J.
Hon'ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.
Hon'ble D.V. Sharma, J.

1. This application has come up before us on being marked by
one of us on 13th September 2010 for placing it before the Bench.

2. Ramesh Chandra Tripathi, defendant no. 17 in O.O.S no. 4 of
1989 has preferred this application purporting to be under Section
89 C.P.C. He has requested for deferment of the pronouncement of
judgment and also to direct the parties to resolve the dispute
through mediation/conciliation/arbitration and/or in such manner as
this Court may deem fit.

3. It is said that after having gone through the Court's order
dated 27.07.2010 and having studied the entire scenario as also the
projected repercussions and apprehensions of violence, the
applicant earnestly and sincerely feels that the wish of this Court,
as found mentioned in the order dated 27.07.2010, needs be given
due respect so much so he treats as a command. Besides certain
media information as also para 89 of the judgment in Dr. M.
Ismail Faruqui vs. Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 360, the
applicant has also placed before us two orders of the Apex Court
dated 20.08.2010 in O.O.S no. 2 of 1988 appointing two
Advocates as mediators in a boundary dispute between the State of
Assam and State of Nagaland requesting them to function as
coordinators. Relying on the above, the applicant requests that this
Court should also direct the parties to resolve the dispute in
question in the same manner.

4. This application was filed without serving copy on the
learned counsels appearing for different parties in these cases.
Those counsels were permitted to receive copy of the application
from the office and thereafter they have filed objections to the
present application.

5. We have heard Sri Prashant Chandra, Senior Advocate
appearing for the applicant.

6. Reply submitted by Sri Jafaryab Zilani, learned counsel for
the Sunni Central Waqf Board, plaintiff in Suit-4 of 1989 (in short
"Suit-4"), Sri Hari Shankar Jain, Advocate, learned counsel for
defendant no.10 in Suit-4 and defendants no. 6/1 and 6/2 in Suit
No. 3 of 1989, Ms. Ranjana Agnihotri for defendant no. 20 in Suit-
4, Sri R.L. Verma for defendant no. 3 in Suit-4, Sri Madan Mohan
Pandey for plaintiff in Suit No. 5 of 1989 and Sri Ajay Pandey,
plaintiff of Suit No. 1 of 1989, is also supported with affidavit of
concerned parties. All the parties through their counsel have not
only seriously opposed this application but they have termed it as a
"serious mischief" on the part of the applicant and, therefore, have
requested this Court to reject it with exemplary costs.

7. At the outset Court would like to place it on record that a
dispute like the present one, if settled amicably between the parties,
it is a most welcome solution and we have no reason to discourage
it. There cannot be a quarrel with the proposition that a matter like
the present one if resolved with the consent of the parties, that
would be the best way of dealing with such matter. It is well
known that a Court of law decides a dispute and not a problem. We
would be the last one for not probing such an alternative redressal
forum and device provided there is some kind of sincerity, bona
fide and possibility, may be a very small ray of hope.

8. However, the record shows that here is a bunch of cases
which has history of several decades of its own and of
extraordinary nature. Efforts at different levels were made
rigorously, persistently and with due seriousness but in vain. Such
efforts were made not only by the parties concerned but at the level
of different authorities so much so, that even three Prime Ministers
at different times took serious initiative to find out whether the
dispute can be resolved amicably and peacefully and took all
possible steps in this direction. It is in furtherance thereof, even
legislation has twice come into being to enable the parties to reach
at an amicable solution. Several times the matter was taken to the
Apex Court also where, as we are informed, the Hon'ble Court did
observe for amicable settlement in the matter. A White Paper was
published by the Government of India and even a Presidential
Reference was made to the Apex Court. At the instance of the then
Prime Minister a very high power committee was constituted,
representatives of both the parties and several other persons were
allowed to participate in the meeting in presence of high officials
including the Minister of State in the Central Government but with
no result.

9. In 1993 a Parliamentary enactment came abating all the suits
connected with the matter and acquiring the property in suit but
when tested on the anvil of constitutionality, a Constitution Bench
of the Apex Court struck down the provision which abated all these
cases. That is how, we are required to decide these cases. The
Presidential Reference remained unanswered by the Constitution
Bench of the Apex Court. In its Judgment in Dr. Ismail Farooqui
(Supra) the Apex Court observed that here is a kind of dispute
which ought to be decided amicably and expressed its hope that the
parties is shall take steps in this direction. One and half decade
since then has passed but with no result. We may also notice that
while returning the Reference, the Apex Court observed that the
same cannot be answered since this was a matter in issue in suits
pending before this Court and the same have to be decided in the
light of the evidence adduced by the parties.

10. One of us (Hon'ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.) was nominated in this
Bench in September 2008 and thereafter final hearing commenced
on 29th September 2008. During the course of arguments
persistently the Court requested and advised the learned counsels to
find out some possibility of compromise in the matter as that would
be the best way of resolving the dispute but nothing came forward.
In a period of about eleven months the Court held actual hearing
for 75 days and throughout the said period this Court made such
efforts though also continued with the hearing since it did not
intend to give an impression to the parties that the Court is not
capable of hearing and deciding the matter or that the Court is
reluctant or that the Court otherwise does not want to decide the
matter even if there is no otherwise hindrance or obstruction in
such a course. The hearing could not conclude due to elevation of
His Lordship Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.R. Alam, J. as the Chief Justice
of Madhya Pradesh High Court. The Bench was reconstituted in
December 2009 and we commenced hearing on 11th Jan. 2010. Due
to reconstitution the learned counsels for the parties requested for
addressing the Court afresh. We had no option. They were justified
in such request. We tried to continue with the hearing on day to
day basis and in a period of about seven and half months the matter
was actually heard on 90 days. During this period also, unrelently,
we made efforts by requesting learned counsel for the parties to
find out the possibility of compromise, if any. Some of the parties
very bluntly told us that in the nature of the rights asserted by
them, scope of compromise is absolutely nil. None was ready to
part away even a single inch of land and said that it is for the Court
to decide but they cannot make any surrender whatsoever. When
we reserved the judgment on 26th July 2010, we made another
effort and passed order informing the parties that on 27th July 2010
we shall sit in Chamber to find out any possibility of resolving the
dispute amicably taking recourse of Section 89 CPC. For a few
ours on 27th July 2010 we made our efforts but the learned counsels
for parties very frankly and succinctly expressed their view that
there is no question of any settlement on their part in the matter and
due to the nature of the claim they assert it cannot be surrendered
to any extent. Faced with the situation but undeterred, still having
some hope we passed order on 27th July 2010, leaving it open to
the parties that before delivery of judgement if they find out any
possibility of compromise, they may approach the OSD requesting
for formation of Bench. This shows endeavour on the part of the
Judiciary at the highest level in the country as well as the Province,
in the last few decades. This also shows our anxiety of finding out
ways and means, if any, for amicable solution of the dispute during
the course of final hearing. But then the moot question is how long
it should/can continue. Is it ad infinitum. Here lies a clash with our
constitutional duty and obligation that whenever a dispute is
brought before a court of law it must be resolved expeditiously and
in any case within a reasonable time.

11. Before proceeding further we also find it appropriate to place
on record something about the conduct of the applicant. During the
course of argument the applicant was initially represented by a
counsel Sri Vireshwar Dwivedi and after his death by Sri
Ramakant Srivastava, Advocate. The applicant's counsel did not
advance any argument though hearing continued as already said,
for full 90 days. Though at one point of time he (Sri R.K.
Srivastava) informed the Court that he will address the matter on
merits but when his turn came, he did not appear. On 27.7.2010
also neither the applicant nor his counsel attempted to participate in
the proceedings which we initiated to find out any possibility of
settlement amicably. On 26.7.2010 when we reserved the
judgment, it was mentioned therein that the judgment shall be
pronounced in the second fortnight of September 2010. Thereafter
on 8.9.2010, i.e., after about a month and half we pronounced the
actual date for delivery of judgment, i.e., 24th September 2010. The
applicant kept silence over the matter throughout. In his application
neither he has averred that there is any possibility of settlement of
dispute outside the Court or otherwise nor it is mentioned that
during this entire period he took any step whatsoever persuading
the parties in suits to arrive at a settlement and/or probing the
possibility of the settlement of dispute amicably. He also had said
nothing about the manner and method whereby the dispute can be
attempted to be settled amicably.

12. We may also place it on record that all the three Judges of the
Bench were available at Lucknow till 8th September 2010 and two
of us were at Lucknow till 9th September 2010 but neither any such
request was made nor any application was moved at that time. It is
only when two of us sitting at Allahabad holding the Court thereat,
abruptly this application was filed on 13.9.2010 which has been
marked by one of us sitting singly on the same date directing to
register the application and place before the Bench for disposal.

13. Learned counsel for the applicant submitted that here is a
matter, the nature whereof is such that possibility of settlement
should be probed continuously and the Court should not feel tired
in making such efforts. Strangely, when we asked what he does
mean by 'continuously' or whether he suggests any time frame or
does he mean 'infinity', he could not reply at all. We are really
surprised to hear the wonderful argument by which he tries to
frighten a Court of law alleging apprehens on of violence if
judgment is delivered and thereby asking the Court not to decide a
case. The ways and means may be sophisticated but the end game
is clear. This is something what the people of India least expect
from a court of law and that too in a highest Court in a Province.

14. These matters are pending for the last six decades inasmuch
as the first suit was filed on 16th January 1950. After transfer of the
suits to this Court three Judges are continuously engaged for the
last more than 21 years. In the meantime, on several occasions the
matter has also travelled and consumed time of the Apex Court as
well. Is it what we have to deliver to our future generation that the
courts of law in India are not capable to decide cases for
generations and on a mere drop of a hat, an excuse is found to defer
the matter or adjourn the case? Are we here to find out ways and
means of deferring adjudication or to make adjudication? No case,
no dispute and no apprehension can be above the honest discharge
of constitutional function by an independent judiciary. The people
of India are already having serious complaints in abundance in
recent past against the judicial system of this country that it keeps
the matter lingering on for generations and attempt to decide cases
is minimal.

15. With the increased awareness, the people are getting
conscious of their right and do not hesitate in asserting it. If the
enforcement of rights get deferred not because of any slackness on
their part, but due to extremely slow pace or inaction on the part of
judiciary, their complaint cannot be levelled frivolous. In a system
of good governance, effective, independent judicial system is not
only the requirement but the real crux lies whether it can deliver
justice within reasonable time; whether it can decide the issue
expeditiously and before the patience of the people exhausts?
These are some of the aspects which need be seriously taken up by
the Bench and Bar both. This is the high time when not only the
Presiding Officers of the Court but also the members of the Bar
who are also officers of the Court should ponder over seriously and
find out the way in which cases may be decided expeditiously
instead of inventing the way for their deferment and adjournments.
The courts are meant for adjudication and not for adjournments or
deferment.

16. All the parties have seriously opposed this application and
have termed this as a mischievous attempt on the part of the
applicant in not allowing these cases decided even after six
decades, particularly when in the judicial proceedings i.e., during
the course of hearing learned counsel for the applicant did not
show any interest whatsoever except of ensuring his technical
presence. From the tenor of the application and also in the absence
of any ground, let alone good ground, the request for deferment of
pronouncement of verdict and that too just about ten days before
the date of its pronouncement, we are constrained to observe that it
lacks bona fide. Reference made to the observations of the Apex
Court in Dr. M. Ismail Faruqui (supra) is wholly misconceived
in the sense that the Apex Court did not suggest even for a moment
that the High Court should not decide the matter at all and prolong
hearing on the pretext of possibility of amicable settlement which
is certainly not to arrive at in this matter inasmuch as, all the
parties have made it very clear to us.

17. The applicant has referred to media reports apprehending
widespread violence and law and order situation. We do not intend
to make any comment thereon but our experience shows when the
Courts have not decided the things, such situation has arisen and
has resulted in creating unrest in the public to take the matter on
the road but not when any decision has been given by a court of
law. When the matter is decided, particularly, when the concerned
Court is not the last Court, the people have further remedy of
appeal etc. and, therefore, they patiently pursue such remedy
keeping their sentiments in low profile. In the above circumstances,
the things remain silent. However, the state of indecisiveness or
the impression that the Courts are reluctant to discharge their
function, create more serious unrest. For us it is not a matter of
simple adjudication but it is our constitutional function and we will
be failing in our duty if we fail to discharge such function within a
reasonable time. We are conscious of our duty as well as
constitutional obligation and shall not allow to weaken the faith of
the people of India which they have bestowed upon us.

18. Since the media reports have been referred we find it
appropriate to say a few words in this regard also. What we find of
late, the reports in media, whether electronic or print, are not
exactly correct. Instead of giving correct information to enlighten
the masses, incomplete and sometimes incorrect information is
given, more as sensation than communication of correct
information. The latter is the prime duty and obligation of a
responsible media. It appears that in some cases, the people try to
highlight a few words in a manner so as to create a sensation. The
casualty in such approach is correctness of the information. The
media people needs to exercise more care and caution and be more
precise. We ourselves have experienced that the information
regarding proceedings of this Court have also been conveyed to
masses, at some places, incorrectly. At times when the published
information relates to a serious situation or sensitive matter which
may likely to have serious repercussions, the responsibility of
media to accuracy and precision of information is much more.
Needless to give a recent illustration where we found such a miss
when there was a terrorist attack in Bombay. We do not intend to
check or restrain the independence of media world. It is they who
form the information limb of any country providing awareness and
entitlement to masses but then such information must be ensured to
be correct.

19. A Court passes an order sitting in the Court Room which is
normally known to the parties in the case and, therefore, used to
confine to few individuals. The masses acquire information about
the happenings in court through media. It is therefore, their utmost
and sacrosanct duty towards masses to whom they actually serve to
provide correct information so that it may avoid any possible
backlash or unwanted reaction particularly in a case like the one we
are faced with. Any inaccuracy in information is likely to cause
much more serious harm. We add no more on this. We hope and
trust that our observations shall be taken in correct perspective and
would give a message to powerful wing, which is commonly
known as the Fourth State. They shall exhibit their responsibility in
a more vigilant, alert, self conscious and self restraint manner so as
to subserve the people of this Country in a best possible and
responsible manner.

20. Before parting one more thing we intend to add. A lot of
news for the last few days are coming about the alleged
apprehension towards security of the members of this Bench and
the measures taken by the Government in this regard. We intend to
place on record and also want to tell everybody that neither we
have any apprehension nor we feel any kind of insecurity in
discharge of our solemn duty and obligation under the constitution
of India. We have full faith and confidence in people of this
country who are our real protectors and at whose strength of
confidence we work. It is not that we lack any confidence in the
Executive in maintaining law and order but the Judiciary of this
Country really derive its power from the confidence, the people of
India have in it, and not from the State's police power. It is
confidence of the people which provides us courage and boldness
in discharge of our duties independently, objectively and without
fear or favour. We have read in the newspapers that the Prime
Minister of the country has assured the people that The
Government is capable of meeting any contingency. We cannot
comment, but repose confidence in the Government since they are
the best Judge of whatever is required in maintaining law and order
and/or security of any individual or group of any individuals as the
case may be shall be taken care. The arrangement of security is the
responsibility of State and they are the authority to assess the
requisite measures and not any individual's own perception.

21. The discussions in respect to the application which we have
already made shows that this application lacks bona fide and is a
clear attempt to divert, deviate and also to create obstruction in
final disposal of this matter after more than six decades without
there being any reason whatsoever. Considering also the fact that
all other learned counsel appearing for different parties, whether
plaintiffs or defendants, have seriously opposed it, we have no
hesitation in rejecting this application. Considering the facts and
circumstances and also the fact that the applicant without any
lawful excuse or reason has filed this application, we hold this
attempt mischievous, and, therefore, he deserves to be imposed
exemplary cost.

22. For the reasons enumerated above, we reject this application
with exemplary costs we which we assess at Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees
Fifty Thousand only).

23. Registrar, High Court, Lucknow Bench, Lucknow is directed
to send a copy of this order forthwith to the Chief Secretary
Government of U.P., Lucknow, Secretary, Department of Home,
Government of India, New Delhi and to the Press Trust of India for
communication to various media channels as well as print media
people for information and compliance.

Dt/17.9.2010

Khaa Gaye Shaam Ke Zindaan Main Andhere Baba - Shadman Raza

Saturday, September 25, 2010

धुम्रपान इस तरह छोडें (How to leave Smoking)


सिग्रेट पीने वाला हर आदमी चाहता है कि उसकी यह आदत छूट जाए फिर भी दुनियां के एक अरब से अधिक लोग इस बुरी आद्त के शिकार है। यह लोग अरबों की संख्या मे सिग्रेट और करोडों रुपये धुआं बना कर उडा देते हैं। विकासशील देशों की तुलना मे विकसित देशो मे इस लत के शिकार लोगों के संख्या अधिक है। इस के सेवन से होने वाले अपार नुकसान से हर धुम्रपान का आदी बखूबी वाकीफ है। फिर भी चूकि एक बार लत पड जाने के बाद इस को छोड पाना मुश्किल हो जाता है इसलिए वह इन्हे नजर अंदाज करके पी जाता है। तम्बाकू क सेबन सिग्रेट, बिडी, चिलम आदि और हुक्के के रुप मे जितना नुकसानदायक है, उतना ही हानिकारक पान और खैनी के रुप मे भी है। हर साल तम्बाकू के इअन विविध प्रयोगों से दुनियां भर के लगभग 30 लाख लोग काल के ग्रास बन जाते है। एक अध्ययन के अनुसार एक सिग्रेट मनुष्य का लगभग 8 मिनट उम्र कम कर देता है।

एक सिग्रेट मे लगभग 32 प्रकार के हानिकारक रासायन पाऐ जाते हैं। हालांकि यह सही हौ कि एक बार सिगरेट की आदत पड जाने के बाद इसे छोडना कठिन होता है परंतु अगर आप धुम्रपान सचमुच छोड्ना चाहती हैं तो वह काम केवल व केवल आप के द्धारा ही संभव है और आसान भी है, बशर्त आप के दिल मे ठोस निश्‍चय और खुद के प्रति ईमानदार हो। अगर आप नीचे लिखे बातों का पालन एक ब्रत के रुप में करें तो वह बुरी लत आसानी से छुट सकती है।

  1. मन मे ठोस निश्‍चय करके कोई एक दिन निश्‍चित कर लें कि फलां दिन से वीडी सिग्रेट नही पिऐगें।

  2. इस बात की सूचना आपने दोस्तों और घर-परिवार वालों को भी दें।

  3. निश्‍चित दिन से सिग्रेट वीडी की तरफ देखें तक नही, यहां तक कि उस दुकान की तरफ जहां से सिग्रेट वीडी खरीदतें हैं, तब तक न जाएं जब तक बह लत छूट न जाए।

  4. इस दौरान हलका एंव सुपाच्य भोजन से कुछ कम ही लें। पानी खूब व बार बार पिएं।

  5. गर्मी के दिनो मे दो-तीन बार स्‍नान भी कर सकते हैं।

  6. सिग्रेट वीडी पीने की जरुरत महसूस होने पर ठंडे पाने से मुँह धो कर लौंग इलाइची या कुछ खा कर किताबें आदि पढ्ने मे व्यस्त हो जाएं।

  7. यह कभी न सोचें कि अच्छा एक बार पी लें फिर नही पीएगें । इससे धोखा होगा।

  8. जितने पैसे आप सिग्रेट वीडी पर खर्च करते थे, उतने पैसे रोज अलग जगह पर रखते जाएं जिस की जानकारी घर के सदस्यों या जिस को आप कह सकें, को भी कह दें।

  9. इन पैसो से आप बीच बीच मे अपने माता-पिता या बीबी-बच्‍चों के लिए कोई सामान खरीद कर लाया करें, इस से आप को आत्मसंतुष्‍टी मिलेगी और परिवार भी खुशाल होगा।

  10. सिग्रेट वीडी पीने से खर्च होने वाला समय कुछ किताबे पढ्ने, जो आप को अच्छा लगे या किचन गार्ड्न बनाने मे बिताएं।

  11. इस तरह तब तक करते रहें जब तक पूर्ण रुप से आद्त छूट न जाए।

उपरोक्त बातो को अपने जीवन मे अपना कर आप सिग्रेट रुपी मीठे जहर से बच सकते हैं।


--
Haider Ajaz

Watch Shakespeare Play : The Tempest

Plot

Feuding noblemen, embroiled in a world of spirits and sorcery, are forced to come to terms with their past when their children meet by chance and fall passionately in love.

Unfamiliar English accents, so prevalent in most Shakespearian productions, are absent from this series. English and drama teachers, as well as the typical playgoer, will find this feature of tremendous value. Shakespeare's own language is preserved; clarity of both language and story is achieved.

Prospero brings King Alonso, Duke Antonio and court attendants safely ashore. Unbeknown to the rest of the castaways, Ferdinand, the King's son, arrives separately and meets Miranda, Prospero's daughter. The two fall in love.

The missing Ferdinand is assumed drowned. Alonso repents of his past deeds, believing Ferdinand's death was punishment for his own wrongdoing. Prospero, convinced that his false brother and the King have reformed, reveals himself as the wronged, but genuine Duke of Milan. The rejoicing group celebrates the wedding of Ferdinand and Miranda.


CLICK ON THE TITLE TO VIEW THE PLAY
--
Haider Ajaz

Thursday, September 23, 2010

State of Karnataka v Bantara Sudhakara @ Sudha and another - Date of Judgment:18 /7/2008 Case No.: Criminal Appeal No. 288 of 2001 - Bench: Dr. Arij

Dr. Arijit Pasayat, J.

1. State of Karnataka is in appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court directing acquittal of the respondents who were charged for commission of offence punishable under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code (in short the `IPC').

2. Background facts as projected by prosecution in a nutshell are as follows:

P.W.1 and PW2 were residing alongwith their respective parents at Madenadu and they were working as coolies in the coffee estate of Pudiyenda Palangappa, Appellant No.2 (accused no. 2) is a tailor by profession having his tailoring shop at Aatekere, On 16-9-1989 at about 9.00 a.m., PWs, 1 & 2 went to the tailoring shop of A-2 and requested him to stitch their blouses. At that time they gave two blouses of theirs for the purpose of measurement along with new clothes. It is alleged that A-2 asked them to come on the following day to take delivery of the blouses if they were stitched. Accordingly, on 17.9.1989 they both went to the tailoring shop to take delivery of the clothes when A-2 informed them that the stitching was not over, upon which both of them asked him to return the blouses given for measurement. In response to that, A-2 asked them to go to his house as the blouses were left in his house. Accordingly, both of them accompanied by A- 1 & A-2 went to the house which was nearby. A-1 & A-2 went inside the house and as they did not come out of the house for about 15 minutes, both PWs. 1 & 2 who were waiting outside entered the house. As soon as they entered the house, A-2 bolted the door and held P.W.2 and A-1 also held PW-l.

They were taken to separate rooms and A-1 committed rape on P.W.1 and A-2 committed rape on PW2, Thereafter, they threatened both of them that they would be murdered if the incident was revealed to anyone, Therefore, they kept quiet, On18-9-1989 they went to Madikeri to the house of Chandrakala (P.W.14). Having stayed in the house of Chandrakala on that night, they went to Sulia to the house of the uncle of P.W.2. As the PWs 1 & 2 were not found in their houses, parents of PWs. 1 & 2 sent Seshappa (PW17) who is the elder brother of PW 2 to his maternal uncle's house at Sulia. Accordingly, he went to the house at Sulia and found both of them and brought them back to Madenadu, Thereafter, they went to Madikeri Rural Police Station on 21- 9-1989 and presented a written complaint Ex-P-l signed by P.W.1 which was received by P.W.26 at 6.45 p.m. On that day, PW 26 registered a case in Madikeri Rural Police Station in Cr,

No.233/89 and submitted FIR as per Ex-P.33. On the next day he sent them for medical examination to the District Hospital, Madikeri. PWs. 1 & 2 also produced clothes which they were wearing at the time of incident which were seized. P.W.26 went to the scene of occurrence which is the house of A-2 where the alleged rape was committed on PWs. 1 & 2, He drew up mahazar Ex-P4 in the house of PW2 in the presence of panchas and seized broken bangles MOs. 8 & 9, He also drew mahazar in the shop of A-2 as per Ex-P3 and seized the clothes given for stitching by PWs. 1 & 2. On 23-9-1989 A-1 was arrested. PW-26 recorded the statement of A-1 who led them to his house where he drew a mahazar as per Ex-P.33.

Thereafter, further investigation was taken up by P.W.24, the Circle Inspector of Police. On 13-11-1989 A-2 appeared before him with order of anticipatory bail. His statement was recorded after arresting him. He also produced clothes that he was wearing at the time of incident from his house which were seized as per Ex-P.29. Both A-1 & A-2 were subjected to medical examination, Dr. G. Marulasiddappa (P.W 25) issued certificate of A-1 as per Ex-P.27 and Dr. Suryakumar (PW-3) issued certificate of A-2 as per Ex P.6. After receipt of the FSL report, he filed a charge sheet. Thereafter, the case was committed to the Court of Sessions, as the offence alleged against these accused persons is in respect of offence punishable under Section 376 exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions. On receipt of this committal order, the Court of Sessions, Kodagu District, registered a case (S.C. No.45/90) and framed charges against the accused for the offence punishable under Sec. 376 IPC, and both the appellants denied the charges and claimed to be tried. To substantiate the case of the prosecution, it examined 27 witnesses and got marked Exs-P1 to P.34 and also MOs. 1 to 24.

3. The case of the respondents was that in view of some property dispute, PWs. l & 2 filed a false case against them and they are innocent.

4. The trial Court found with reference to the evidence on record, more particularly the documents exhibited by the teacher of the school (PW 16) that the age of the victims in each case was less than 16 years. Therefore the trial Court held that the question of consent was irrelevant and immaterial. In appeal, the High Court held that the age was more than 16 years and there was consent and accordingly directed acquittal.

5. Learned counsel for the appellant-State submitted that the High Court has fallen into grave error by holding that the age of each of the victims was more than 16 years. Further there was no plea regarding consent and therefore the High Court on its own could not have made out a case of consent.

6. Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand submitted that the factual scenario clearly shows consent and the High Court's conclusion about the age and consent cannot be faulted.

7. It is to be noted that the teacher-PW 16 referred to the certificates which indicated that the date of birth of PW 1 was 5.3.1974 and the date of birth of PW2 was 1.2.1974. Exhibits P.16 & P.17 are the certificates. The High Court referred to the evidence of the lady doctor PW 24 with reference to the X- Ray report which indicated that the age of PWs. 1 & 2 fell between 14 to 16 years. The High Court observed that there was possibility of two years variation and therefore it was to be taken that the victims were more than 16 years of age. The High Court accepted that there was sexual intercourse and rejected the plea of false implication. Thereafter it went on to examine the question of consent. So far as the reasonings of the High Court are concerned they border on absurdity. All types of surmises and conjectures have been arrived at. Strangely, it was observed that PW16 the Head Master's evidence was to be discarded on the ground that the date of birth may not have been recorded on the basis of any medical certificate or other documentary evidence to show that these two girls were born on the date as mentioned. The High Court's conclusions in this regard are not only fallacious but contrary to the evidence on record. The High Court recorded a further finding that the two certificates may not relate to the victims though it specifically recorded that there was no such challenge raised by the accused. Additionally, merely because the doctor's evidence showed that the victims belong to the age group of 14 and 16, to conclude that the two years age has to be added to the upper age limit is without any foundation. There was no basis for coming to such a conclusion. In any event, the accused persons did not take the stand that there was any consent. On the contrary, they pleaded that they were falsely implicated. In State of H.P. v.
Shree Kant Shekari
[2004 (8) SCC 153] it was observed as follows:

"The factors which seem to have weighed with the High Court are (i) the age of the victim, which according to the High Court was more than 16 years; (ii) no evidence has been placed by the prosecution to show that the victim had not consented to the act; and (iii) the time of alleged rape as given by the victim and her mother was improbabilised by the medical evidence. A particular reference was made to the fact that a child was born on 10.4.1979 and if the alleged rape has been committed during the period indicated by the victim and her mother the same would have been altogether different periods. The delay in lodging the first information report was also highlighted to attach vulnerability to the prosecution case.

We shall first deal with the question of age. The radiological test indicated age of the victim between 15 to 16= years. The school records were produced to establish that her date of birth was 10.4.1979. The relevant documents are Ex.PW6/A to PW6/C. The High Court was of the view that these documents were not sufficient to establish age of the victim because there was another document Ex.PW7/A which according to the High Court did not relate to the victim. Merely because one document which was produced by the prosecution did not, according to the High Court relate to the victim that was not sufficient to ignore the evidentiary value of Ex.PW6/A to Ex.PW6/C. These were records regarding admission of the victim to the school and her period of study. These documents unerringly prove that the date of birth of the victim as per official records was 10.4.1979. Therefore, on the date of occurrence and even when the FIR was lodged on 20.11.1993 she was about 14 years of age. Therefore, the question of consent was really of no consequence.

Even otherwise the High Court seems to have fallen in grave error in coming to the conclusion that the victim has not shown that the act was not done with her consent. It was not for the victim to show that there was no consent. Factually also the conclusion is erroneous right from the beginning that is from the stage when the FIR was lodged and in her evidence there was a categorical statement that the rape was forcibly done notwithstanding protest by the victim. The High Court was therefore wrong in putting burden on the victim to show that there was no consent. The question of consent is really a matter of defence by the accused and it was for him to place materials to show that there was consent. It is significant to note that during cross examination and the statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the `Code') plea of consent was not taken or pleaded. In fact in the statement under Section 313 of the Code the plea was complete denial and false implication."

8. Above being the position, judgment of the High Court is clearly unsustainable and set aside. The judgment of the trial Court is restored. The respondents shall surrender to custody to suffer remainder of sentence, if any.

9. Appeal is allowed.

--

Haider Ajaz

C.M. Girish Babu v C.B.I., Cochin, High Court of Kerala - Date of Judgment: 24/2/2009 Case No.: Criminal Appeal No. 377 of 2009 - Bench: Lokeshwar S

Judgment: Arising out of SLP(Crl) No.578 of 2008
Sudershan Reddy, J.
- Leave granted

The appellant along with Accused No.1 was tried for offences under Section 120B of IPC read with Section 7 and 13 (2) read with 13(1) (d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as "the said Act") by Special Judge (SPE/CBI)-I, Ernakulam who by his judgment dated 30th March, 2002 convicted the appellant for the offence punishable 2 under Section 7 read with Section 13(1) (d) and 13(2) of the said Act. He was acquitted of the charge under Section 120B of the IPC. The appellant was accordingly sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of Rs.20,000. In default for payment of fine the appellant was further ordered to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a further period of six months for the offence punishable under Section 13(1) read with Section 13(2) of the said Act. He was also sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years for the offence punishable under Section 7 of the said Act. The substantive sentences were directed to run concurrently.

3. The appellant preferred an appeal to the Kerala High Court at Ernakulam, which dismissed the appeal by its judgment dated 28th November, 2007. However, the Appellate Court reduced the substantive sentence to that of one year only. The High Court acquitted the first accused of all the charges against which State preferred no appeal. This appeal 3 is brought, by special leave against the judgment of the High Court.

4. The prosecution case is that while accused no.1 working as the Inspector of Central Excise, Air Cargo Complex, Trivandrum, demanded an amount of Rs.1,500/- as gratification from one Dayanandhan-PW10 and Prakash Kumar-PW2, who were the Senior Assistant and Manager respectively of M/s. Interfrieght Services Pvt. Ltd., Trivandrum as a motive or reward for giving clearance for a wet grinder booked by one P. S. Shine to be sent to Dubai.

5. The appellant was also working as Inspector of Central Excise, Air Cargo Complex, Trivandrum along with Accused no. 1. On 2nd October, 1999 at about 6 a.m. the appellant is stated to have actually demanded the amount of Rs.1,500/- from Dayanandhan-PW10 as gratification for clearing the same wet grinder and accepted the bribe amount for himself and on behalf of accused no.1 and thereby committed offences under 4 Section 7 read with Section 13(1) (d) and 13(2) of the said Act.

6. The prosecution story as unfolded during the trial is that the appellant and Accused no. 1 together conspired and committed the act of demanding and accepting gratification.

7. In the present case, it may not be really necessary to discuss the entire evidence available on record for the simple reason that the High Court acquitted the Accused no. 1 of all the charges and found no case against him. It is the Accused no. 1 who is stated to have demanded the gratification for clearing and sending wet grinder to Dubai. The High Court as well as the trial court found that there was no criminal conspiracy between the appellant and accused no. 1 and therefore acquitted both of them of the charge under Section 120B of the IPC. 5

8. The High Court upon re-appreciation of evidence came to the conclusion that the prosecution miserably failed to prove the charge against the appellant for the offence under Section 13 (1) (d) read with Section 13 (2) of the said Act. In this regard, the High Court found that there is nothing in the evidence of PW-11 - Natarajan, official witness, to arrive at any conclusion of appellant making any demand of gratification. PW-11 stated that from the conversation between the appellant and PW-10, he could heard the appellant asking "is it ready?" and PW-10 only nodding his head. It is for that reason the High Court recorded that the alleged demand by the appellant on 2.10.1999 is highly doubtful and is not proved beyond reasonable doubt. The High Court relied upon yet another circumstance creating a doubt as regards the demand of any gratification by the appellant as there is no mention of any such demand in Exhibit P-9 - post trap mahazar. The High Court accordingly acquitted the appellant of charges under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the said Act. 6

9. The prosecution story mainly rested upon the evidence of PW-10 who is the central figure in the entire story of the prosecution. He did not support the prosecution story and was declared hostile. It was to him that the Accused No.1 had allegedly made a demand of gratification on the morning of 1.10.99 and it was in his presence Accused No.1 repeated the demand when he went along with PW-2 in the evening of 1.10.99 to the Air Cargo office. This is the version given by PW-2. But PW-10 does not support this story. PW-10 in his evidence stated that on 1.10.99 Accused No.1 in the morning hours suggested certain corrections in the documents as regards the valuation and description of the item that was to be sent to Dubai. When PW-10 went back to office and told PW-2, PW-2 said that no correction need be made. Thereafter both of them visited Air Cargo Complex. It is in the evidence of PW-10 that he alone went inside the room to meet Accused no. 1 and told him that no corrections possibly could be made as PW-2 was not interested in making the suggested 7 corrections. But Accused no. 1 insisted for carrying out corrections if the item was to be cleared for its despatch to Dubai. Then PW-10 requested the Accused no. 1 to meet PW-2 but Accused no. 1 retorted saying that whoever he may be, he will not meet him. 10. Be it noted that PW-2 thereafter never visited Air Cargo Complex till he came with the trap party early in the morning on

2.10.1999. PW-2 in his evidence stated that on 2.10.99 PW-10-Dayanadhan came to office at 4.30 a.m. and informed him that he went to the Air Cargo office and found that Accused no. 1 was not on duty and the appellant was on duty. According to PW-2, PW-10 informed him that on inquiry about the cargo the appellant told him that Accused no. 1 has already apprised him about the cargo and accordingly it would be cleared only if Rs.1500/- is brought. PW2 stated in his evidence that he immediately wrote Exh.P2-complaint. He clearly admitted in his evidence that he had no personal knowledge as to what transpired between PW-10 and the 8 appellant at the Air Cargo Office. The evidence of PW-2 about the demand of bribe amount by the appellant is hear say and therefore inadmissible.

11. Interestingly enough, PW-10 does not support the story narrated by PW-2. According to him when he went to the Air Cargo Complex on 2nd October, PW-2 and another person who came to send the wet grinder was with him and PW-2 asked him to give Rs.1500/- to the appellant saying that it was a loan repayable by PW-2 to Accused no.1. He accordingly collected the money from PW-2 and gave it to the appellant. He in categorical terms accepted that the appellant had never demanded any bribe amount from him. The evidence of PW-10 also suggests that PW-2 was near the import Hall at a distance of about 40 metres between the Air Maldives Godown and import Hall.

12. An analysis of the evidence of PW-2, PW-10 and PW- 11 the official witness reveals the following: 9 a) The prosecution miserably failed to establish the theory of criminal conspiracy hatched by the appellant along with Accused no. 1 to demand and receive gratification; b) The prosecution miserably failed to establish its theory that there was a demand of gratification by Accused no.1 on 1.10.99; c) There is no proof on any demand of gratification by the appellant on 2.10.99; d) The evidence of PW-11, the official witness, Assistant Manager, Vigilance of FCI to the effect all that he heard was appellant asking PW-10 "is it ready?" to which PW- 10 nodded his head. This evidence of the official witness present at the time of trap does not establish that there was any demand of gratification by the appellant. There is no reason to disbelieve the evidence of PW-11; e) Exhibit P-9 post trap mahazar does not record the factum of any demand of gratification by the appellant. 10

13. The evidence on record suggests that PW10 had given money to the appellant stating that it was a loan repayable by PW2 to accused no.1. The appellant was lulled into that belief based on which he received the amount from PW-10.

14. The fact remains that the prosecution established through evidence of PW-12 and PW-13 and Exhibit P9-post trap mahazar that MO IV series tainted currency notes were recovered from the pocket of the appellant. A question then arises for consideration is that whether the recovery of the tainted money itself is sufficient to convict the appellant under Section 7 of the said Act?

15. The crucial question would be whether the appellant had demanded any amount as gratification to show any official favour and whether the said amount was paid by PW-10 and received by the appellant as consideration for showing such official favour. The only evidence available in this regard 11 is that of PW-10 who did not support the case of the prosecution. The appellant at the earliest point of time explained that it was not the bribe amount received by him but the same was given to him by PW-10, saying that it was towards repayment of loan taken by his Manager-PW2 from the Accused no.1. This is evident from the suggestion put to PW-2 even before PW-10 was examined. Similar suggestion was put to the investigating officer that he had not recorded the version given by the appellant correctly in the post trap mahazar-Exhibit-P9 and no proper opportunity was given to explain the sequence of events.

16. In Suraj Mal Vs. State (Delhi Admn.) reported in [(1979) 4 SCC 725], this court took the view that mere recovery of tainted money divorced from the circumstances under which it is paid is not sufficient to convict the accused when the substantive evidence in the case is not reliable. The mere recovery by itself cannot prove the charge of the prosecution against the accused, in the absence of any 12 evidence to prove payment of bribe or to show the accused voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to be bribe.

17. The learned counsel for the CBI submitted that the onus of proof was upon the appellant to explain as to how he came into possession of the amount recovered from him during the trap. The argument of the learned counsel is obviously based on Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 which reads as under: "20. Presumption where public servant accepts gratification other than legal remuneration.- (1) Where, in any trial of an offence punishable under Section 7 of Section 11 or clause (a) or clause (b) of sub- section (1) of Section 13 it is proved that an accused person has accepted or obtained or has agreed to accept or attempted to obtain for himself, or for any other person, any gratification (other than legal remuneration) or any valuable thing from any person, it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that he accepted or obtained or agreed to accept or attempted to obtain that gratification or that valuable thing, as the case may be, as a motive or reward such as is mentioned in section 7 or, as the case may be, without consideration or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate. 13 (2) Where in any trial of an offence punishable under Section 12 or under clause (b) of section 14, it is proved that any gratification (other than legal remuneration) or any valuable thing has been given or offered to be given or attempted to be given by an accused person, it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that he gave or offered to give or attempted to give that gratification or that valuable thing, as the case may be, as a motive or reward such as is mentioned in Section 7, or as the case may be without consideration or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections (1) (2), the court may decline to draw the presumption referred to in either of the said sub-sections, if the gratification or thing aforesaid is, in its opinion, so trivial that no interference of corruption may fairly be drawn."

18. A three-Judge Bench in M. Narsinga Rao Vs. State of A.P. (2001) 1 SCC 691 while dealing with the contention that it is not enough that some currency notes were handed over to the public servant to make it acceptance of gratification and prosecution has a further duty to prove that what was paid amounted to gratification, observed: 14 "........................we think it is not necessary to deal with the matter in detail because in a recent decision rendered by us the said aspect has been dealt with at length. (Vide Madhukar Bhaskarrao Joshi v. State of Maharashtra.) The following statement made by us in the said decision would be the answer to the aforesaid contention raised by the learned counsel: (SCC p.577, para 12) The premise to be established on the facts for drawing the presumption is that there was payment or acceptance of gratification. Once the said premise is established the inference to be drawn is that the said gratification was accepted `as motive or reward' for doing or forbearing to do any official act. So the word `gratification' need not be stretched to mean reward because reward is the outcome of the presumption which the court has to draw on the factual premise that there was payment of gratification. This will again be fortified by looking at the collocation of two expressions adjacent to each other like `gratification or any valuable thing'. If acceptance of any valuable thing can help to draw the presumption that it was accepted as motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do an official act, the word `gratification' must be treated in the context to mean any payment for giving satisfaction to the public servant who received it."

19. It is well settled that the presumption to be drawn under Section 20 is not an inviolable one. The accused charged with the offence could rebut it either through the cross-examination of the witnesses cited against him or by 15 adducing reliable evidence. If the accused fails to disprove the presumption the same would stick and then it can be held by the Court that the prosecution has proved that the accused received the amount towards gratification.

20. It is equally well settled that the burden of proof placed upon the accused person against whom the presumption is made under Section 20 of the Act is not akin to that of burden placed on the prosecution to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt. "It is well established that where the burden of an issue lies upon the accused he is not required to discharge that burden by leading evidence of proof his case beyond a reasonable doubt. That is, of course, the test prescribed in deciding whether the prosecution has discharged its onus to prove the guilt of the accused; but the same test cannot be applied to an accused person who seeks to discharge the burden placed upon him under Section 4 under the Prevention of Corruption Act. It is sufficient if the accused person succeeds in proving a preponderance of probability in 16 favour of his case. It is not necessary for the accused person to prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt or in default to incur verdict of guilt. The onus of proof lying upon the accused person is to prove his case by a preponderance of probability. As soon as he succeeds in doing so, the burden shifts to prosecution which still has to discharge its original onus that never shifts, i.e.; that of establishing on the whole case the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt." (See Jhangan Vs. State 1966 (3) SCR 736). (Emphasis supplied)

21. It is against this background of principles we have examined the contention of the appellant that the charges under Section 7 of the Act have not been proved against him. It was argued by Shri U. U. Lalit, Senior counsel, that the circumstances found by the High Court in their totality do not establish that the appellant accepted the amount of Rs.1500/- as gratification. Having examined the findings of both the Courts, we are satisfied that the appellant has proved his case by the test of preponderance of probability and we accordingly 17 reach the conclusion that the amount was not taken by the appellant as gratification. He was made to believe that amount paid to him was towards the repayment of loan taken by PW2 from Accused no. 1.

22. The prosecution failed in establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant received any gratification.

23. For the aforesaid reasons, we find it difficult to sustain the conviction of the appellant under Section 7 of the said Act. Accordingly, the conviction of the appellant and the sentence imposed upon him is set aside. 24. The appeal is allowed.

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Haider Ajaz

SC defers Allahabad HC verdict on Ayodhya title suit till September 28


The court issued notice to all the parties to the title suit and asked the attorney general to be present in the court when the case is heard on September 28.

The SC said there's no harm in giving negotiations a last try. It's a matter of consequences which will affect vast majority. A judgement will harden the parties. So give negotiations a chance.

Though one of the judges felt the plea to defer should be dismissed, he bowed to the other judge's wish.

Earlier in the day, the Supreme Court decided to examine this afternoon the plea for deferment of the Allahabad High Court verdict on the Ayodhya title suit.

The apex court had yesterday declined to hear urgently the plea to postpone the Ayodhya title suit verdict by the Allahabad High Court tomorrow.

A bench of the court, while refusing to hear the petition filed by retired bureaucrat Ramesh Chand Tripathi, said that it did not have the "determination" to take up the issue and added that it will be listed before another Bench.

Tripathi had yesterday approached the apex court five days after the High Court's Ayodhya bench rejected his petition for deferring the verdict and to allow mediation to find a solution to the contentious dispute.

The Allahabad High Court had also imposed "exemplary costs" of Rs 50,000, terming Tripathi's effort for an out-of-court settlement of the dispute as a "mischievous attempt".

The Special Leave Petition by Tripathi, which sought some time to allow mediation, also challenged the costs imposed on him.

Like his petition before the High Court, Tripathi in his petition in the apex court, claimed that the verdict might disturb communal harmony and lead to violence in the country.

In the petition filed through advocate Sunil Jain, Tripathi had cited several reasons for deferment of the verdict, which he said would be in "public interest" in view of the apprehension of communal flare up, upcoming Commonwealth Games, elections in Bihar and violence in Kashmir Valley and Naxal-hit states.

The petition had feared that there would be inadequate security personnel in Uttar Pradesh to provide security.

Tripathi had also referred to an earlier order of the Court on July 27 last that parties concerned are at liberty to approach the Officer on Special Duty for formation of the bench if there was any possibility of disposal of the dispute or arrival at an understanding through consensus.

One of the three judges in the Lucknow bench, however, disagreed with the majority order rejecting the plea for deferring the Ayodhya verdict to allow mediation and gave a dissenting opinion that an amicable settlement could have been explored.

Justice Dharam Veer Sharma, while not concurring with the view of the other two judges--Justice S U Khan and Justice Sudhir Agarwal--also said in his dissenting judgement that he wasn't consulted when the three-judge bench gave the order while dismissing the plea for mediation.

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Haider Ajaz

Student, not a consumer of Education Board


In CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3911 of 2003 Bihar SchoolExamination Board v.Suresh Prasad Sinha decided on 04/09/2009 the Supreme Court considered the question, whether a statutory School Examination Board comes within the purview of the Consumer Protection Act? The Supreme Court observed that there is some confusion and divergence in the decisions of the National Commission on this issue. In some cases, it has been held that Examination Boards do not come within the purview of the Act. In some other cases, the Commission has held that though holding of examinations is a statutory function, issue of mark-sheets and certificates etc., is an administrative function, and therefore, the Examination Boards are amenable to the jurisdiction of consumer forum if there is negligence amounting to deficiency in service, in such consequential administrative functions.

The definitions of the terms `service' and `deficiency' in clauses (o) and (g) of Section 2 of the Act which are relevant, are extracted below:

"Section 2(o): `Service' means service of any description which is made available to potential users and includes, but not limited to, the provisions of facilities in connection with banking, financing, insurance, transport, processing, supply of electrical or other energy, board or lodging or both, housing construction, entertainment, amusement or the purveying of news or other information, but does not include the rendering of any service free of charge or under a contract of personal service;

Section 2(g): `Deficiency' means any fault, imperfection, shortcoming or inadequacy in the quality, nature and manner of performance which is required to be maintained by or under any law for the time being in force or has been undertaken to be performed by a person in pursuance of a contract or otherwise in relation to any service."

According to the definition of 'consumer' in Section 2(d) of the Act, a person who hires or avails of any services for a consideration, is a consumer. The following category of service-availors will not be consumers: (i) persons who avail any service for any commercial purpose; (ii) persons who avail any free service; and (iii) persons who avail any service under any contract of service. A consumer is entitled to file a complaint under the Act if there is any deficiency in service provided or rendered by the service-provider.

The Board is a statutory authority established under the Bihar School Examination Board Act, 1952. The function of the Board is to conduct school examinations. This statutory function involves holding periodical examinations, evaluating the answer scripts, declaring the results and issuing certificates. The process of holding examinations, evaluating answer scripts, declaring results and issuing certificates are different stages of a single statutory non-commercial function. It is not possible to divide this function as partly statutory and partly administrative. When the Examination Board conducts an examination in discharge of its statutory function, it does not offer its "services" to an candidate. Nor does a student who participates in the examination conducted by the Board, hires or avails of any service from the Board for a consideration. On the other hand, a candidate who participates in the examination conducted by the Board, is a person who has undergone a course of study and who requests the Board to test him as to whether he has imbibed sufficient knowledge to be fit to be declared as having successfully completed the said course of education; and if so, determine his position or rank or competence vis-`-vis other examinees. The process is not therefore availment of a service by a student, but participation in a general examination conducted by the Board to ascertain whether he is eligible and fit to be considered as having successfully completed the secondary education course. The examination fee paid by the student is not the consideration for availment of any service, but the charge paid for the privilege of participation in the examination.

The Court held that the object of the Act is to cover in its net, services offered or rendered for a consideration. Any service rendered for a consideration is presumed to be a commercial activity in its broadest sense (including professional activity or quasi-commercial activity). But the Act does not intended to cover discharge of a statutory function of examining whether a candidate is fit to be declared as having successfully completed a course by passing the examination. The fact that in the course of conduct of the examination, or evaluation of answer-scripts, or furnishing of mark-sheets or certificates, there may be some negligence, omission or deficiency, does not convert the Board into a service-provider for a consideration, nor convert the examinee into a consumer who can make a complaint under the Act. We are clearly of the view that the Board is not a `service provider' and a student who takes an examination is not a `consumer' and consequently, complaint under the Act will not be maintainable against the Board.

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Haider Ajaz

Wednesday, September 22, 2010

Is it the time to change reservation system in India?

IS RESERVATION paying its real dividends? Is it trespassing the fundamental law of equality of citizens?

I guess, without any thought we all agree that reservation has not only failed to provide inclusive growth to every section of backward castes but also deprived talented people of getting equal opportunities.

Before going further about this burning topic, let's go back into the origin of reservation. What were the objectives? Why was it set?

Reservation is one of the recommendation of Indian Constitution to uplift certain sections of Indian society, which are denied of equal opportunities since centuries on the basis of caste, gender and geographical regions. Initially the idea is to review and subsequently decrease it after five years. But it has been increasing since then.

Moreover, we have enlarged our quota list from scheduled castes and scheduled tribes to 'other backward castes' and 'reservation for upper castes'. Towards the end of 20th century, Mandal Commission further increased the reservation quota. It followed numerous protests. People started linking reservation to violation of equal rights.

Only then, Supreme Court of India introduced the ceiling of 50 per cent to save fundamental law of equal opportunities.

Furthermore, there has been a talk of incentives from government to private companies implementing reservation in private sector. Government is also thinking to enforce reservation for fairer gender in Indian Parliament.

That is all the brief history of reservation. Now, let's ponder a little what reservation has bought to us.

Undoubtedly, reservation has uplifted the social status of schedule castes and bought them into mainstream. It has sunken the caste biases at least at professional and urbane level. It is great achievement of Indian democratic system that we have representatives of these castes in all top positions in bureaucracy and law enforcing agencies. These 'oppressed' people are more free now and raise their voice to claim their rights.

Unfortunately, in spite of all these achievements, reservation didn't come with full expectations. It failed miserably to revive the fortunes of scheduled tribes which are generally located in remote locations. Other backward castes- which constitute 52 per cent of Indian population, have some sections which can not be marked as economically weak or socially deprived. But, they are still harnessing the benefits of reservation.

Moreover, our education system is so expensive that only a small chunk of lower castes has been able to afford this education. That is the reason why most of the quota seats remain vacant. Only a few rich among the reserved class afford to reach that stage.

Unfortunately, reservation has also bought wrong values in society. Vote-bank politics is being played on the name of reservation. We have latest examples of protests of a certain section of society in Rajasthan following the reservation status given to other community in the region. All political parties were patronising such protests to protect their votebank. Undoubtedly, these opinion based demands damage our democracy.

Moreover, we are also facing an acute problem of brain drain. Most of the professionals from prestigious Indian universities such as AIIMS, NITs, IITs are not willing to serve government organisations and going overseas for opportunities, results in to a great talent crunch. This may be one of the reason for lagging government project and policies.

Even after writing all this, I believe in a dream. Dream to give reservation benefit to very person of under-privilege class in next 20 years. Surprised to know that! How can we give reservation benefit to all in next 20 years? We had failed to provide its benefit to 25 per cent of population from last 60 years. How is it possible? Well, it is possible.

I believe reservation benefits should only be given to one generation in a family. If one generation has received jobs through reservation, there is no logic in providing quota to the second generation of same family. Doing so, we can spread reservation benefits to a larger population.

Moreover, reservation benefits should only be given a fixed number of times to a person. It should not be like that a person is enjoying the quota while taking admission in university, again getting a job and then getting promotion, again getting subsidised housing etc. Prohibiting a person to get multiple reservation benefits will give opportunity to other people in under-privilege class.

The current ceiling to identify creamy layer among OBCs needs to be amended. Right now, annual income of 4.5 lakh is not practical for small cities where expenses are less.

I believe, there is a need to provide need-based scholarship to lower castes so that they can afford this costly education. Providing a good scholarship is more important than increasing reservation quota. If we don’t have adequate qualified candidates, what is the use of reservation?

Reservation should have lifetime predefined at the time of implementation and government should constantly come up with the innovative solutions to uplift backward castes.

If we analyse, our constitution makers had come up with a good innovative reservation. Only, we have twisted this idea and misused it.

Definitely, reservation alone is not the solution. If we implement it with proper amendments and other incentives like scholarship then we can reap rich dividends from it and realise the dream of inclusive growth.

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Haider Ajaz
CURRENT MOON